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THE ANATOMY OF A MURDER: WHO KILLED
AMERICA’S ECONOMY?
 






The main cause of the crisis was the behavior of the banks—largely
a result of misguided incentives unrestrained by good regulation. Conservative
ideology, along with unrealistic economic models of perfect information, perfect
competition, and perfect markets, fostered lax regulation, and campaign contribu-
tions helped the political process along. The banks misjudged risk, wildly over-
leveraged, and paid their executives handsomely for being short-sighted; lax
regulation let them get away with it—putting at risk the entire economy. The
mortgage brokers neglected due diligence, since they would not bear the risk of
default once their mortgages had been securitized and sold to others. Others can be
blamed: the ratings agencies that judged subprime securities as investment grade;
the Fed, which contributed low interest rates; the Bush administration, whose Iraq
war and tax cuts for the rich made low interest rates necessary. But low interest
rates can be a boon; it was the financial institutions that turned them into a bust.
 
The search is on for whom to blame for the global economic crisis. It is
not just a matter of vindictiveness; it is important to know who or what
caused the crisis if one is to figure out how to prevent another, or perhaps
even to fix this one.
The notion of causation is, however, complex. Presumably, it means
something like, “If only the guilty party had taken another course of
action, the crisis would not have occurred.” But the consequences of one
party changing its actions depend on the behavior of others; presumably
the actions of other parties, too, may have changed.
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Consider a murder. We can identify who pulled the trigger. But
somebody had to sell that person the gun. Somebody may have paid the
gunman. Somebody may have provided inside information about the
whereabouts of the victim. All of these people are party to the crime. If
the person who paid the gunman was determined to have his victim shot,
then even if the particular gunman who ended up pulling the trigger had
refused the job, the victim would have been shot: Someone else would
have been found to pull the trigger.
There are many parties to this crime—both people and institutions.
Any discussion of “who is to blame” conjures up names like Robert
Rubin, co-conspirator in deregulation and a senior official in one of the
two financial institutions into which the American government has
poured the most money. Then there was Alan Greenspan, who also
pushed the deregulatory philosophy; who failed to use the regulatory
authority that he had; who encouraged homeowners to take out highly





—making lower interest rates, which fed the bubble, neces-
sary to stimulate the economy. But if these people hadn’t been there,
others would have occupied their seats, arguably doing similar things.
There were others equally willing and able to perpetrate the crimes.
Moreover, the fact that similar problems arose in other countries—with
different people playing the parts of the protagonists—suggests that there
were more fundamental economic forces at play.
The list of institutions that must assume considerable responsibility for
the crisis includes the investment banks and the investors; the credit-
rating agencies; the regulators, including the S.E.C. and the Federal
Reserve; the mortgage brokers; and a string of administrations, from
Bush to Reagan, that pushed financial-sector deregulation. Some of these
institutions contributed to the crisis in multiple roles—most notably the
Federal Reserve, which failed in its role as regulator, but which also may
have contributed to the crisis by mishandling interest rates and credit





But I would argue that blame should be centrally placed on the banks
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The banks were supposed to be the experts in risk management. They
not only didn’t manage risk; they created it. They engaged in excessive












 percent change in asset
values wipes out one’s net worth. (To put matters in perspective, real-

















 percent, at least.) The banks adopted
incentive structures that were designed to induce short-sighted and
excessively risky behavior. The stock options that they used to pay some
of their senior executives, moreover, provided incentives for bad
accounting, including incentives to engage in extensive off-balance-sheet
accounting.
The bankers seemingly didn’t understand the risks that were being
created by securitization—including those arising from information
asymmetries: The originators of the mortgages did not end up holding
onto them, so the originators didn’t bear the consequences of any failure
at due diligence. The bankers also misestimated the extent of correlation
among default rates in different parts of the country—not realizing that a
rise in the interest rate or an increase in unemployment might have
adverse effects in many parts of the country—and they underestimated
the risk of real-estate price declines. Nor did the banks assess with any
degree of accuracy the risks associated with some of the new financial
products, such as low- or no-documentation loans.
The only defense that the bankers have—and it’s admittedly a weak
defense—is that their investors made them do it. Their investors didn’t
understand risk. They confused high returns brought on by excessive
leverage in an up market with “smart” investment. Banks that didn’t
engage in excessive leverage, and so had lower returns, were “punished”
by having their stock values beaten down. The reality, however, is that
the banks exploited this investor ignorance to push their stock prices up,
getting higher short-term returns at the expense of higher risk.
 
Accessories to the Crime
 
If the banks were the main perpetrators of the crime, they had many
accomplices.
Rating agencies played a central role. They believed in financial
alchemy, and converted F-rated subprime mortgages into A-rated



































important, because it allowed a steady flow of cash into the housing
market, which in turn provided the fuel for the housing bubble. The
rating agencies’ behavior may have been affected by the perverse incen-
tive of being paid by those that they rated, but I suspect that even without
these incentive problems, their models would have been badly flawed.
Competition, in this case, had a perverse effect: It caused a race to the
bottom—a race to provide ratings that were most favorable to those
being rated.
Mortgage brokers played a key role: They were less interested in orig-
inating good mortgages—after all, they didn’t hold the mortgages for




 mortgages. Some of the mortgage
brokers were so enthusiastic that they invented new forms of mortgages:
The low- or no-documentation loans to which I referred earlier were an
invitation to deception, and came to be called liar loans. This was an
“innovation,” but there was a good reason that such innovations hadn’t
occurred before.
Other new mortgage products—low- or no-amortization, variable-
rate loans—snared unwary borrowers. Home-equity loans, too, encour-
aged Americans to borrow against the equity in their homes, increasing
the (total) loan-to-value ratios and thereby making the mortgages riskier.
The mortgage originators didn’t focus on risk, but rather on transac-
tions costs. But they weren’t trying to minimize transactions costs; they
were trying to maximize them—devising ways that they could increase
them, and thereby their revenues. Short-term loans that had to be
refinanced—and left open the risk of not being able to be refinanced—
were particularly useful in this respect.
The transactions costs generated by writing mortgages provided a
strong incentive to prey on innocent and inexperienced borrowers—for
instance by encouraging more short-term lending and borrowing, entail-
ing repeated loan restructurings, which helped generate high transactions
costs.
The regulators, too were accomplices in crime. They should have
recognized the inherent risks in the new products; they should have done
their own risk assessments, rather than relying on self-regulation or on
the credit-rating agencies. They should have realized the risks associated
with high leverage, with over-the-counter derivatives, and especially the
risks that were compounding as these were not netted out.
The regulators deceived themselves into thinking that if only they
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incentive, presumably, to do), then the system would work. Amazingly,




, though concerns about
systemic risk constitute one of the primary rationales for regulation in the
first place. Even if every bank were, “on average,” sound, they could act
in a correlated way that generated risks to the economy as a whole.
In some cases, the regulators had a defense: They had no legal basis for
acting, even had they discovered something was wrong. They had not
been given the power to regulate derivatives. But that defense is some-
what disingenuous, because some of the regulators—most notably
Greenspan—had worked hard to make sure that appropriate regulations
were not adopted.
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act played an especial role, not just
because of the conflicts of interest that it opened up (made so evident in
the Enron and WorldCom scandals), but also because it transmitted the
risk-taking culture of investment banking to commercial banks, which
should have acted in a far more prudential manner.




 regulation and regulators that were at fault.
There should have been tougher enforcement of antitrust laws. Banks
were allowed to grow to be too big to fail—or too big to be managed.
And such banks have perverse incentives. When it’s heads I win, tails you
lose, too-big-to-fail banks have incentives to engage in excessive risk
taking.
Corporate governance laws, too, are partly to blame. Regulators and
investors should have been aware of the risks that the peculiar incentive
structures engendered. These did not even serve shareholder interests
well. In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, there was
much discussion of the need for reform, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
represented a beginning. But it didn’t attack perhaps the most fundamen-
tal problem: stock options.
Bush’s and Clinton’s capital-gains tax cuts, in conjunction with the
deductibility of interest, provided enhanced incentives for leverage—for




There is one other set of accomplices—the economists who provided the
arguments that those in the financial markets found so convenient and



































assumptions of perfect information, perfect competition, and perfect
markets—in which regulation was unnecessary.
Modern economic theories, particularly those focusing on imperfect
and asymmetric information and on systematic irrationalities, especially
with respect to risk judgments, had explained how flawed those earlier
“neoclassical” models were. They had shown that those models were not
robust—even slight deviations from the extreme assumptions destroyed
the conclusions. But these insights were simply ignored.
Some important strands in recent economic theory, moreover,
encouraged central bankers to focus solely on fighting inflation. They
seemed to argue that low inflation was necessary, and almost sufficient,
for stable and robust growth. The result was that central bankers (includ-
ing the Fed) played little attention to the financial structure.
In short, many of the most popular micro-economic and macro-
economic theories aided and abetted regulators, investors, bankers, and
policymakers—they provided the “rationale” for their policies and
actions. They made the bankers believe that in pursuing their self-
interest, they were, in fact, advancing the well-being of society; they
made the regulators believe that in pursuing their policies of benign









) has tried to shift the blame for low interest rates
to China, because of its high savings rate. Clearly, Greenspan’s defense is
unpersuasive: The Fed had enough control, at least in the short run, to
have raised interest rates in spite of China’s willingness to lend to America
at a relatively low interest rate. Indeed, the Fed did just that in the middle
of the decade, which contributed—predictably—to the popping of the
housing bubble.
Low interest rates did feed the bubble. But that is not the necessary
consequence of low interest rates. Many countries yearn for low interest
rates to help finance needed investment. The funds could have been
channeled into more productive uses. Our financial markets failed to do
that. Our regulatory authorities allowed the financial markets (including
the banks) to use the abundance of funds in ways that were not socially
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bubble. They had the tools to stop this. They didn’t use the tools that
they had.
If we are to blame low interest rates for “feeding” the frenzy, then we
have to ask what induced the Fed to pursue low interest rates. It did so,
in part, to maintain the strength of the economy, which was suffering
from inadequate aggregate demand as a result of the collapse of the tech
bubble.
In that regard, Bush’s tax cut for the rich was perhaps pivotal. It was
not designed to stimulate the economy and did so only to a limited
extent. His war in Iraq, too, played an important role. In its aftermath,








 a barrel. (We don’t have to parse
out here what fraction of this increase is due to the war; but there is little





now spending hundreds of billions of dollars a year more to import oil.





s, when oil prices soared, most countries faced recessions
because of the transfer of purchasing power abroad to finance the purchase
of oil. There was one exception: Latin America, which used debt finance
to continue its consumption unabated. But its borrowing was unsustain-
able. Over the last decade, America took the Latin American route. To
offset the negative effect of higher spending on oil, the Fed kept interest
rates 
 
lower than they otherwise would have been
 
, and this fed the housing
bubble more than it otherwise would have. The American economy, like




s, seemed to be doing well,
because the housing bubble fed a consumption boom, as household
savings fell all the way down to zero.
Given the war and the consequent soaring oil prices and given Bush’s
poorly designed tax cuts, the burden of maintaining economic strength
fell to the Fed. The Fed could have exercised its authority as a regulator
to do what it could do to direct the resources into more productive uses.
Here, the Fed and its chairman have a double culpability. Not only did
they fail in their regulatory role, they became cheerleaders for the bubble
that eventually consumed America. When asked about a possible bubble,
Greenspan suggested there was none—only a little froth. That was clearly
wrong. The Fed argued that you could not tell a bubble until after it




 there is a bubble
until after it breaks, but one can make strong probabilistic statements.
All policy is made in the context of uncertainty. House prices, espe-



































stagnated: There was a clear problem. And it was clear that the problem
would get worse once interest rates rose. Greenspan had encouraged
people to take out variable-rate mortgages when interest rates were at
historically low levels. And he allowed them to borrow up to the hilt—
assuming interest rates would remain at the same low level. But because
interest rates were so low—real interest rates were negative—it was
unreasonable to expect them to remain at that level for long. When they
rose, it was clear that many Americans would be in trouble—and so
would the lenders who had lent to them.
Apologists for the Fed sometimes try to defend this irresponsible and
short-sighted policy by saying they had no choice: Raising interest rates
would have killed the bubble, but also would have killed the economy.
But the Fed has more tools than just the interest rate. There were, for
instance, a number of regulatory actions that would have dampened the
bubble. It chose not to employ these tools. It could have reduced maxi-
mum loan-to-value ratios as the likelihood of a bubble increased; it could
have lowered the maximum house payment-to-income ratios allowed. If
it believed it did not have the requisite tools, it could have gone to
Congress and requested them.




 satisfactory counterfactual. True, perhaps
the money could have been deployed by financial markets more produc-
tively, to support, for instance, more innovation, or important projects in
developing countries. But perhaps the financial markets would have





Just as all of the accomplices are not equally culpable, some suspects
should be acquitted.
In the long list of possible culprits, there are two that many Republi-
cans often name. They find it difficult to accept that markets fail, that
market participants could act in such an irresponsible manner, that the
wizards of finance didn’t understand risk, that capitalism has serious flaws.
It is government, they are sure, which is to blame.
I have suggested government is indeed to blame, but for doing too little.
The conservative critics believe that government is to blame for doing
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requirements imposed on banks, which required them to lend a certain
fraction of their portfolio to underserved minority communities. They also
blame Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the peculiar government-sponsored




, play a very large role in
mortgage markets. Fannie and Freddie were, according to conservatives,
“under pressure” from Congress and the president to expand home
ownership (President Bush often talked about the “ownership society”).
This is clearly just an attempt to shift blame. A recent Fed study






2008). The problems in America’s mortgage markets
began with the subprime market, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
primarily financed “conforming” (prime) mortgages.
It is America’s fully private financial markets that invented all the bad
practices that played a central role in this crisis. When government
encouraged home ownership, it meant permanent home ownership. It
didn’t intend for people to buy homes beyond their ability to afford
them. That would generate ephemeral gains, and contribute to impover-
ishment: The poor would lose their life savings as they lost their home.
There is always a home that is of an appropriate cost to an individual’s
budget. The irony is that because of the bubble, many of the impover-
ished wound up owning a home no bigger than they would have if more
prudent lending policies had been enforced—which would have
dampened the bubble. To be sure, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did get
into the high-risk high leverage “games” that were the fad in the private
sector, though rather late, and rather ineptly. Here, too, there was
regulatory failure; the government-sponsored enterprises have a special
regulator which should have constrained them, but evidently, amidst the
deregulatory philosophy of the Bush Administration, did not. Once they
entered the game, they had an advantage, because they could borrow
somewhat more cheaply because of their (ambiguous at the time)
government guarantee. They could arbitrage that guarantee to generate
bonuses comparable to those that they saw were being “earned” by their
counterparts in the fully private sector.
Politics and Economics
There is one more important culprit, which, in fact, has played a key
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political system, and especially its dependence on campaign contribu-
tions. This allowed Wall Street to exercise the enormous influence that
it has had, to push for the stripping of regulations and to the appointment
of regulators who didn’t believe in regulations—with the predictable and
predicted consequences (Stiglitz 2003) that we have seen. Even today,
that influence is playing a role in the design of effective means of address-
ing the financial crisis.
Any economy needs rules and referees. Our rules and referees were
shaped by special interests; ironically, it is not even clear whether those
rules and referees served those special interests well. It is clear that they
did not serve the national interests well.
In the end, this is a crisis of our economic and political system. Each
of the players was, to a large extent, doing what they thought they should
do. The bankers were maximizing their incomes, given the rules of the
game. The rules of the game said that they should use their political
influence to get regulations and regulators that allowed them, and the
corporations they headed, to walk away with as much money as they
could. The politicians responded to the rules of the game: They had to
raise money to get elected, and to do that, they had to please powerful
and wealthy constituents. There were economists who provided the
politicians, the bankers, and the regulators with a convenient ideology:
According to this ideology, the policies and practices that they were
pursuing would supposedly benefit all.
There are those who now would like to reconstruct the system as it
was prior to 2008. They will push for regulatory reform, but it will be
more cosmetic than real. Banks that are too big to fail will be allowed to
continue little changed. There will be “oversight,” whatever that means.
But the banks will continue to be able to gamble, and they will continue
to be too big to fail. Accounting standards will be relaxed, to give them
greater leeway. Little will be done about incentive structures or even
risky practices. If so, then, another crisis is sure to follow.
NOTE
1. Greenspan supported the 2001 tax cut even though he should have known that
it would have led to the deficits which previously he had treated as such an anath-
ema. His argument that, unless we acted now, the surpluses that were accumu-
lating as a result of Clinton’s prudent fiscal policies would drain the economy of
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one of the worst arguments from a respected government official I have ever
heard; presumably, if the contingency he imagined—the wiping out of the
national debt—was imminent, Congress had the tools and incentives with which
to correct the situation in short order.
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